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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY of NEW A'RK, 
NEW JERSEY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURTTY BANK OF 
UTAH, NATIONAL 
AS'SOCI.NTI 0 N, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9891 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Ac1tion by plain tiff insurance company to re-
cover from defendant, an intermediary bank Which 
cashed plaintiff's settlement draft on the forged 
endorsement of one of the payees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pre-trial hearing the only issue set for 
trial was whether or not plain tiff was guHty of 
laches in presecuting its claim against defendant. 
At the trial, the same judge held that plaintiff had 
no valid claim against defendant because of laches 
of a third party and entered judgment for de-
fendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's 
judgment, and in the alternative a new trial. 
STA:TEMENT OF FA!CTS 
On February 4, 19'59, a 1957 Chevrolet auto-
mobile owned by one Alb urn Holder, dba "200" 
Motors, was dam·aged by coUision. The automobile 
was covered by a policy of insurance issued by the 
plaintiff to Alburn Holder. City Finance Company 
was a loss payee on the policy of insurance. The 
damaged autdmobile was taken 'to Keith Walton 
Bo1dy Shop for repairs. ( R. 2'2 and 23). 
On March 30, 19'59, the plaintiff issued its 
draft in the amount of $624.9'6 payable to ''200" 
Motors and Keith Walton Body Shop in p·ayment of 
damages 'to the 19'5'7 Chevrolet automobile. The 
draft was endorsed in the business name of "200" 
Motors and Keith Walton Body Shop, fue latter be-
ing forged, and on April 16, 1959, was deposited 
to the account of "200" Motors at the Brigham City 
office of defendant bank. ( R. 23) . 
In May 1959, Alburn Holder, dba "200" Motors, 
went out of business and on June 12, 195'9, a war-
rant was issued against him charging interstate 
transportation of forged securities on May 20 & 22, 
1959. Keith Walton Body Shop never received the 
proceeds of plaintiff's draft issued M'arch 30, 19'59, 
because of its endorsement being forged thereon. 
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However, City Finance Company subsequently satis-
fied the interest of Keith Walton Body Shop in the 
automobile, :and thereafter on December 22, 1960, 
by its counsel, made formal demand upon plaintiff, 
through its counsel, for reimbursement of $624.96, 
the amount of damages inflicted upon the automo-
bile in question by virtue of its status as a "loss 
payee" on the policy of insurance issued by the 
plaintiff. However, not until March 9, 1961, was 
plaintiff's counsel furnished samples of Keith 
Walton's signature by City Finance Company so that 
the alleged forgery of the former's endorsem·ent of 
plaintiff's draft could be verified. At this time, 
Alburn Holder, the supposed forger of Keith Wal-
ton's endorsement, had been in federal custody -for 
13 months. He had been sentenced and committed 
on February 8, 1960. (R. 2'3 & 24). 
Plaintiff's counsel, after investigating the for-
gery and determining the interest of Keith W'alton 
in the automobile and City Finance Company's in~ 
sura'ble interest therein to the extent of the value of 
the collision damage to the auto1nobile, advised plain-
tiff on June 21, 1961, that City Finance Company 
had a valid claim and on July 11, 1961, plaintiff 
made demand for reimbursement upon the drawee 
bank, Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Company of San 
Francisco, California. On July 18, 1961, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank through its Salt L·ake City 
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Branch, made demand for reimbursement upon de-
fendant's Brigham City Branch bank (R. 25). 
Plain tiff was unable to recover the loss through 
normal banking channels and on October 18, 1961, 
was sued by City Finance Company for the amount 
of the loss. The plaintiff paid City Finance Com-
pany on November 30, 1961, and on April 26, 1962, 
commenced the present action against the defendant. 
After surviving two Motions to Dismiss by the de-
fendant, a pre-trial hearing was held December 20, 
1962, at which time, the Court held as a matter 
of law that the plain tiff was the real party in in-
terest and asserted a valid cause of action. The pre-
trial ju'dge set for trial only the issue as to whether 
or not the plaintiff was guilty of laches which 
would b'ar its claim ( R. 7) . Trial of the issue was 
had on January 25, 19'63 and after close of the evi-
dence, the Court interjected the issue of whether or 
not plain tiff would be barred from recovering from 
defendant because of the delay of City Finance Com-
pany in making claim 'against the plaintiff (R. 94-
96) and in its Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 3, & 4 
( R. t2) made this point the basis of denying plain-
tiff's c}aim. P!aintiff moved for amendment of the 
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and in ~he alternative for a new trial. However, 
~he mdtion was denied except with respect to ·amend-
ing the findings of fact and in this regard, it was 
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granted. Plaintiff then filed a timely appeal with 
this Court from the judgment of No Cause of Ac-
tion entered by the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVI'DE'NCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE J'UDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
LACHE'S. 
1The concept of laches is define1d in Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Section 1442: 
HLaches in legal significance is not mere de-
lay, but delay that works a disadvantage to 
another." 
The above definition was cited by this Court in 
Mawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 U. 14'2, 2312 P.2d 769 
( 1951), and regarding the time element stated at 
Page 149: 
"Because the remedy of reformation and de-
fensive laches sought to be interposed are both 
creations of equity, the mere passage of 32 
months without any showing of prejudicial 
r, injury does nat constitute laches as a matter 
of law. The question of laches c'an only be de-
termined under ithe circumstances of each 
case and there must be a finding that the de-
lay has inequitably prejudiced the defendant 
before the remedy is barred. 'There is no in-
dication in the Complaint that defendants 
have altered their position or that they have 
been mislead to their damage by plaintiff's 
delay in commencing this action." 
Regarding the element of prejudice in delay, 
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the Court in a more recent case, Hackford vs. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, 1'2 U.2d 2'50, 364 P.2d 
1091 ( 1961) stated: 
"As to the ques1tion of laches: It is sufficient 
to call attention to the facts under which the 
claimed laches ~curred and to the principle 
that 'laches in legal significance is not mere 
del:ay, but delay that works a disadvantage 
to another,' which we do not see as existing 
here.'' 
.Nt the trial of the case at bar, defendant opened 
and pre'sented evidence first, since it had the burden 
of proving the defense of laches. Denfendant's first 
wi1tness was Morri's Glover, Vice President of de-
fendant's Brigham City Branch. His testimony in-
di'cated he did not receive knowledge of the forgery 
until July 18, 19'61 (R. 44) which resulted from 
plaintiff's deman1ds for reimbursement through reg-
ular banking channels. Defendant's second witness 
was David Brooks, an employee of City Finance 
Company, who testified on cross-examination (R. 
59) that there was nothing in the files of City 
Finance Company that indiC'ated that the Finance 
Company had furnished any evidence to the plain-
tiff that Keith Walton's endorsement had been 
forged on plaintiff's draft. Defendant's third wit-
ness was Keith Walton, owner of Keith Walton 
Body Shop, who testified that he had never made a 
demand upon the pl'aintiff regarding payment of the 
repairs and, in fact, did not know the name of the 
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insurance company involved ( R. 65). Consequently, 
the plaintiff did not receive any notice from him 
regarding the forgery. Defendant's fourth witness 
was Elma A. Campbell, an employee of Utah Motor 
Club and Motor Club Insurance Agency, who testi-
fied tha;t her files contained no reference that either 
City Finance Company or Keith Walton Body Shop 
had ever furnished her office with any information 
regarding the forgery (R. 78). Therefore, the agent 
received no knowledge which would have been im-
!i putable to the plaintiff regarding the forgery. De-
t' fendant's fifth witness was Joseph P. M1cCarthy, 
attorney for Alburn Holder, who made no reference 
,_. to ever furnishing information to plaintiff regard-
~{ ing the forgery. Defendant's sixth and last witness 
~~·: Was Lewis T. Wells, Claims Examiner wi tl1 the 
American Fore Loyalty Group's Salt L'ake City of-
., fice, whose testimony indicated no knowledge of the 
forgery until he was contacted by Mr. Merlin Lybbert 
of Hanson & B'aldwin, pl'ain tiff's local counsel ( R. 
c 83). 
The first information received re'garding the 
alleged forgery imputable to the p~aintiff was the 
letter of G. Hal Taylor, attorney for City Finance 
1
1 Company, to Mr. Lybbert dated December 22, 1960, 
.·. ~· ( R. 24 para. 14) and plain tiff's counsel was not 
furnished with samples of Keith W!alton's signature 
'· 
')' so that the alleged forgery could be verified until 
..., 
' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
March 9, 1961 (R. 24 para. 14b). This was 13 
months after Alburn Holder had been committed 
to the Federal Penetentiary at Atlanta, Georgi~a, for 
30 months on February 8, 1960. Any delay by the 
plaintiff in bringing suit against the defendant 
after it received knowledge of the forgery could not 
possibly have prejudice1d defendant's opportuni1ty of 
recovering from Alburn Holder since he had 'already 
been in prison for several m·onths. If there is no 
prejudici·al delay, there is no laches. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIA'L COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO ~MEN'D ITS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS AMENDED FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
The essence of the conclusions of law entered 
by ~~he trial court is that City Finance Company, 
the loss payee, delayed unreasonably in determining 
that l{eith Walton's signature was a forgery and 
in filing its claim with the plaintiff for payment 
of the amount of the loss, :and that plaintiff was 
not, therefore, legally obligated to pay the claim of 
City Finance Company and thereby incur the loss 
which i1t now seeks to recover from the defendant. 
Plaintiff con1tends that the findings of fact, 
as ~amended, do not support the conclusions of law 
for the following reasons: 
1. Gi ty Finance Company as a loss payee on 
1!he policy of insurance issued by the plain tiff had 
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a contract right to -recover from the plaintiff the 
amount of damages inflicted upon the automobile 
covered by plaintiff's policy of insurance and it 
filed its claim within the period of limitations pro-
vided by Section 78-12-2'3 U.C.A., 196'3. 
2. City Finance Company had no claim against 
the plaintiff arising out of the issuance of the draft 
in question or any forgery thereon because it was 
not a party to the draft. City Finance Company's 
only claim against the plaintiff was one in contract 
based on its status as a loss payee on the policy of 
insurance issued by the plaintiff which was a con-
tract right, independent of any forgery committed 
on plaintiff's draft. 
3. The loss occurred February 4, 19'59, and 
City Finance Company filed suit against the pl'ain-
tiff to recover the value of the loss on October 18, 
1961, well within the six year period of limitations 
provided for the commencement of contract actions. 
Therefore, plain1tiff could not have resisted the 
claim of City Finance Company because as stated by 
the Court in Fisher vs. Davis, 77 U. 81, 291 Pac. 
493, the equitable principle of laches will not defeat 
a legal right asserted within the period of limita-
tions provided by statute for commencing such an 
action. In that case a title dispute was involved and 
regarding laches the court stated: 
"The plaintiff has argued in his brief that the 
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defenfant's title is barred by laches. It is not 
contended that the statute of limitations has 
run or adverse possession has been estab-
lished. It is merely contended that, because 
defendant permitted the tax S'ale proceeding 
to be had without obligation and without the 
assertion of his title, he ought not now, in 
equity, be permitted to assert his ti tie. This 
contention is without merit. Defendant's claim 
is one of legal ti tie, and is governed by the 
statute of limitations. Laches apply to equit-
!able demands. If a legal right gets into equity, 
the statute governs." 
4. The action brought by the plaintiff is not 
a subrogation action, and is not an equitable action. 
It is a legal action brought in the plaintiff's own 
right well within the statute of limitations provided. 
Since the action is not a subrogation ~action, the 
defalcations of the insured, Alburn Holder, are not 
imputable to the plaintiff and neither are any acts 
of the loss payee, City Finance Company, since a 
"loss payee" is not considered an "insured" for such 
purposes. Welch vs. British American Assurance 
Company, '82 Pac. 964, Riddle vs. Rochester, Germ_an 
Insurance Company of N. Y., 89 Atl. 833. 'The action 
is a legal one based on ·an implied in law contract 
and the period of limitations in which the action 
must be brought thereon would be four years as 
provi'ded by Section 78-12-25 U.C.A., 1953. The 
defendant hank paid Alburn Holder on the forged 
endorsement of Keith Watton Body Shop on April 
10 
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16, 1959 and plaintiff commenced its action against 
defendant on April 26, 19'6'1, well within the period 
of limitations. 
5. Any delay by Keith Walton 'Body Shop in 
making demand for payment from City Fin·ance 
Company could not affect plairrtiff's action against 
the defendant since Keith WaTton Body Shop had 
made no demand upon the plaintiff as ·a result of 
the alleged forgery of its endorsement ·and it was 
not an agent, assignor, or prior party in interest 
of the plaintiff. 
POINT Il'I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
GROUNDS OF SURPRISE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF 
THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ~HJaHt!K!E.:)JfM///M? 
As previously mentioned, Judge A. H. Ellett, 
sitting as the pre-trial judge, found for the pl:ain-
tiff on all allegations of the complaint, and reserved 
for trial only the question of whether or not the 
plain tiff was guilty of laches. The Court's ruling 
on the validity of plaintiff's cause of action 'against 
the defendant is well supported by American Juris-
prudence, Vol. 7, Banks, Section 594, and cases ·an-
notated thereunder. No issue was raised at the trial 
regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint 
in this regard. 
At the close of the evidence, the Court inter-
jected, temporarily, questions regarding Keith Wal-
11 
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ton's Body Shop's interest in the automobile which 
was damaged as noted by the discussion between 
Court and counsel ( R. 94 line 24 'to R. 99 line 12). 
However, through the argument which was not re-
ported, the Court was satisfied on this point, but 
then interjected the issue of whether or not city 
Finance Company was guilty of laches in presenting 
its claim to the plaintiff, thus making the plaintiff 
a volunteer when it pai1d City Finance Company 
as loss payee on the insurance policy. 'This issue 
was never raised by the defendant in the pleadings, 
Motions to Dismiss, Pre-trial Hearing or at the 
trial until raised by the Court at the close of the 
evidence, and after the reporter was dismissed as 
attested by the fact that sucll issue is nowhere re-
ferred to or mentioned in the record. 
1This fact was cited by the plaintiff 'as grounds 
for a new trial (R. 16), but the same was denied 
(R. 21). Plaintiff contends that there is no question 
but that the interjection of this issue constituted 
surprise to 1the plaintiff which it could not reason-
ably anticipate since the issue had never been pre-
viously raised and the only issue set for trial by 
the Pre-trial Order was whether or not the plaintiff 
itself was guilty of laches. That it was prejudicial 
to the plain1tfff is beyond question since it was the 
basis on which the trial court found judgment for 
the. defendant. 
12 
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In order to determine whether or not City 
Finance Company was guilty of laches in making 
claim against the plaintiff, if the Court allows the 
interjection of this defense to its contract cl'aim 
under the loss payable provisions of the insurance 
policy issued by the plaintiff, it would be necessary 
to determine whether or not Alburn Holder was 
available for. service of process and solvent enough 
to satisfy a judgment during the period from ap-
proximately June 1959 when City Finance Company 
evidently first had some information that Keith 
Walton Body Shop had not been paid to March 9, 
1961 when it furnished samples of Keith Walton's 
signature to the plaintiff for comparison purposes. 
The fact that Alburn Holder was indicted for inter-
state transportation of forged securities on May 
20 & 22, 1959 and taken into custody in July 19'59 
(R. 24 para. 10) places ~his point in 'great uncer-
tainty. Certainly, the trial court cannot assume that 
collection proceedings would have been successful 
during this period of time merely because the de-
fendant was released on bond for approxim·ately 
six months in Atlanta, Georgia. Plaintiff did not 
prepare to offer evidence on this point since it reas-
onably assumed it would only h'ave to account for 
Holder's solvency subsequent to December 22, 1960 
when it first received formal demand from City 
Finance Company for payment under the loss pay-
1 •) 
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able provisions of the insurance policy issued by 
plaintiff, and this it did by showing he had been in 
felderal prison since the previous February. 'There-
fore, if City Finance Company's alleged laches is 
allowed to become an issue in ·~his case, plaintiff 
should be granted a new trial in order to have op-
portunity to offer evidence in this regard . 
CONCLUSION • 
Appellant and plaintiff below contends that the 
record conclusively shows that it was not guilty of 
laches since 'the wrongdoer, Alburn Holder, had been 
in prison for over one year before appellant was 
furnished samples of Keith Walton's signature so 
that it could verify the forgery and any delay in 
bringing suit after that time was inconsequential to 
defendant's remedies against Holder. Appellant fur-
ther contends that i't was obligated to pay City Fin-
ance Company pursuant to the latter's contract 
rights on the policy of insurance as loss payee, and 
that if the ~alleged laches of City Finance Company 
is to become an issue in this case, a new trial should 
be granted to allow introduction of evidence on this 
point. However, appellant verily believes that the 
contentions that City Finance Company was guilty 
of }aches which would have defeated rts claim against 
the appellant, or that the appellant was guilty of 
laches in bringing suit against respondent bank 
are without metit since both actions were legal·ac-
1·1 
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tions brought well within the appropriate periods 
of limitation and laches is not properly available 
as a defense to a legal claim under such circum-
stances, but that the law is as stated in Fisher vs. 
Davis, supra, wherein this Court Stlated, "If a legal 
right gets into equity, the statute governs." 
For these reasons, appellant prays that the 
judgment of the trial ·court be reversed and appel-
lant be granted judgment as prayed below, and in· 
the !alternative for a new trial to introduce evidence 
as mentioned above. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
H. Wayne Wadsworth 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
15 
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